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Platt: Commercial Speech and the First Amendment: An Emerging Doctrine

COMMERCIAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: AN EMERGING DOCTRINE
The extent to which commercial advertising merits the protection of the first amendment has been debated for over forty
years.' To this day, commercial speech issues of central concern
to our market-oriented society remain unsettled. 2 The purpose of
this comment is to trace briefly the historical development of the
first amendment as it relates to commercial advertising and to
analyze the approach to commercial speech problems set forth by
the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.3
I.

EARLY TREATMENT OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH

Prior to 1942, the United States Supreme Court frequently
examined state regulation of commercial advertising.4 In only a
few instances, however, did the Court examine such regulation in
the light of first amendment challenges.5
In an early decision, Ex parte Jackson,I the Court upheld a
federal statute which prohibited the mailing of lottery advertisements. Attempting to balance the advertiser's freedom of speech
with congressional power "[tio establish Post Offices and post
Roads,"' 7 the majority opinion recognized that "[tlhe difficulty
1. See, e.g., Chrestensen v. Valentine, 34 F. Supp. 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1940), aff'd, 122
F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. Commercial speech litigation has been based on both first amendment and antitrust principles. See, e.g., In re Bates & O'Steen, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris. noted
sub nom. Bates & O'Steen v. Arizona State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976) (No. 76-316); Justice
Department Charges Code Advertising Provisions Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, 62
A.B.A.J. 979 (1976)..
3. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
4. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285
U.S. 105 (1932); Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913). The consensus
before the 1940's was that the first amendment protected mainly political and religious
speech. Therefore, commercial advertisement was regulable as would be any other commercial activity. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
5. But see Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Lewis
Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
6. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). The statute read, in pertinent part: "No letter or circular
concerning lotteries, so-called gift-concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes, or
concerning schemes devised and intended to deceive and defraud the public, for the
purpose of obtaining money under false pretences, shall be carried in the mail." Act of
July 12, 1876, ch. 186, 19 Stat. 90 (amending original Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, 17 Stat.
302) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970)).
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
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attending the subject arises, not from the want of power in Congress to prescribe regulations as to what shall constitute mail
matter, but from the necessity of enforcing them consistently
with rights reserved to the people, of far greater importance than
the transportation of the mail." 8
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Field dealt summarily
with the advertiser's contention that the statute wrongly prohibited mailing advertisements of lawful lotteries:
All that Congress meant by this act was, that the mail
should not be used to transport.

. .

corrupting publications and

articles, and that any one who attempted to use it for that
purpose should be punished. The same inhibition has been extended to circulars concerning lotteries,-institutions which are
supposed to have a demoralizing influence upon the people.'
Thus, Mr. Justice Field found advertisements of even lawful lotteries to be excludable from the mails not because they were
commercial, but because they were "demoralizing." Although the
regulated communication at issue in Ex parte Jackson consisted
of a commercial advertisement, the Court did not discuss whether
the advertisement merited first amendment protection.'"
In a later mail censorship decision, Leach v. Carlile," the
Court reviewed a postmaster's decision to prohibit appellant from
advertising "miracle cures"' 2 by mail. Although a majority of the
8. Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1877). The rights referred to consist of the first

amendment rights to free speech and a free press.
9. Id. at 736.
10. Id. The Court's entire discussion of first amendment rights would have been
unnecessary had the Court held commercial advertisements to be entirely regulable. The
Court refrained from such a drastic measure, and proceeded on the assumption that the
lottery advertisements were constitutionally indistinguishable from other mail matter.
11. 258 U.S. 138 (1922).
12. Leach v. Carlile, 267 F. 61 (7th Cir. 1920), aff'd, 258 U.S. 138 (1922). The advertisement read, in part:
"A powerful nerve-building, strength-giving tonic and invigorating treatment, such as Organo Tablets, is needed to assist lagging energy, strengthen the
nerves that control the sexual organs, and bring back to normal strength those
organs that are weak."
"Testicular extract is prescribed by leading physicians throughout the civilized world for Nervous Weakness, General Debility, Sexual Decline or Weakened Manhood, Urinary Disorders, Lame Back, Lack of ambition, energy and
nerve force, Sleeplessness, and Run Down System."
"Organo Tablets are not an experiment, * * * are a reliable preparation for
building up wasted organs and low vitality; increases the 'stamina,' the staying
power, the responsive nerve force, that makes you capable of enjoying life;
invigorates man's virile strength; a reliable treatment for all Nervous Affections,
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Court voted to uphold the postmaster's decision, the case is noteworthy for its dissent. 13 Justice Holmes, with Justice Brandeis
concurring in the dissent, recognized that appellant's objection to
the postmaster's action rose to constitutional proportions. The
two dissenters found that the ruination of appellant's business by
forbidding him to advertise by mail constituted an abridgement
of the freedom of speech." The notion inheres in the HolmesBrandeis dissent that commercial advertising deserves the protection of the first amendment because livelihoods depend upon
the unfettered communication of commercial information."
In the preceding two mail censorship cases, both of which
dealt with commercial advertising, several Justices did not distinguish between the protection afforded commercial speech and
that afforded noncommercial speech. Nevertheless, in 1942 the
Court ignored both cases in deciding that commercial advertisement is unprotected by the first amendment. Prior to 1942, most
attacks on the governmental regulation of commercial advertising
were based on due process 17 and equal protection 8 grounds, rather
than on first amendment grounds. 9 Although the first amendment had been held applicable to the states years earlier,"0 it was
not until Valentine v. Chrestensen" that the Court began to draw
Nervous Debility, Physical Weaknesses, and Functional Disorders."
267 F. at 66-67.
13. Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
14. Id. at 141. The majority veiwed Leach as an ordinary review of administrative
action. Id. at 138.
15. Id. at 141. Mr. Justice Holmes wrote:
The question is only whether [Congress] may make possible irreparable wrongs
and the ruin of a business in the hope of preventing some cases of a private
wrong that generally is accomplished without the aid of the mail. Usually private swindling does not depend upon the postoffice. If the execution of this law
does not abridge freedom of speech I do not quite see what could be said to do
so.
Id.
16. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
17. See, e.g., Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Lewis Publishing Co. v.
Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
18. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1948); Packer
Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S.
467 (1911).
19. But see Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230 (1915); Lewis
Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
20. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S.
233 (1936); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925).
21. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
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a constitutional distinction between the regulability of commercial speech and that of noncommercial speech."

II. Chrestensen CONFUSION
The first Supreme Court decision which explicitly addressed
the question whether commercial advertising merits first amendment protection relied upon neither Ex parte Jackson 3 nor the
Holmes-Brandeis dissent in Leach v. Carlile.21 Indeed, with bewildering results, the majority in Chrestensen relied upon no first
amendment precedent whatsoever.2 In Chrestensen the Court
reviewed a New York City ordinance2 prohibiting distribution
of all handbills except those "solely devoted to 'information or
a public protest.' "27 The defendant had been convicted of distributing handbills which were in part devoted to advertising
his business. Demonstrating considerable deference to legislative judgment, Justice Roberts' majority opinion stated:
This court has unequivocally held that the streets are proper places for the exercise of the freedom of communicating
information ... and that, though the states and municipalities
may appropriately regulate the privilege in the public interest,
they may not unduly burden or proscribe its employment in
these public thoroughfares. We are equally clear that the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.2
The above-quoted propositions lead syllogistically to the conclusion that the states may "unduly burden or proscribe" commercial advertising. Thus Chrestensen has been read to stand for the
proposition that commercial advertisement falls utterly outside
29
the ambit of first amendment protection.
Since its Chrestensen decision, the Court has explained that
speech is unprotected only if it is purely commercial in content.'"
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 54.
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
258 U.S. 138 (1922).
Id. See aLso summary of petitioners' briefs at 86 L. Ed. 1262 (1942).

26. NEW

YORK Crry,

N.Y.,

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

§ 755(2)-7.0(5) (1970).

27. 316 U.S. 52, 53 (1942).
28. Id. at 54.
29. See, e.g., Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring); Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp.
683, 685-86 (E.D. Va. 1974), aft'd, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).

30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964); Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147 (1959); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Follett v. Town
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The mere fact that profit is earned by the sale of information does
not rob that information of first amendment protection. 3 Nonetheless, Chrestensen has been sharply criticized by several Justices because it stands firmly against any protection for speech
which is commercial in content. 32 Justice Douglas has stated:
"The ruling was casual, almost offhand. . . .It has not survived
reflection."
The Court's failure to enunciate the policy underlying its
Chrestensen decision exacerbated the difficulty in distinguishing
between protected and commercial speech. Perhaps an accurate
statement of the judicial reason for finding commercial speech to
be unprotected can be found in a lower court opinion in
Chrestensen:
Such men as Thomas Paine, John Milton and Thomas Jefferson were not fighting for the right to peddle commercial advertising .... [A]s ours is a profit economy, no business man
need apologize for seeking personal gain by all legitimate means.
But the constitutional limitations on legislation affecting such
pursuits are not as specific and exacting as those imposed on
legislation interfering with free speech.3
of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1944); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111
(1943).
31. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964). In New York Times
the communication under review consisted of an allegedly libelous political advertisement. The majority opinion stated: "The publication here was not a 'commercial' advertisement in the sense in which the word was used in Chrestensen.... That the Times
was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immaterial in this connection as is the
fact that newspapers and books are sold." Id. at 266.
32. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 314 n.6 (1974) (dissenting
opinion); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376,
393, 398, 401 (1973) (dissenting opinions).
33. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513-14 (1958) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Grove, 404 U.S. 898, 905 (1971) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
34. Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 524 (2d Cir. 1941) (dissenting opinion),
rev 'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Accord, Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory
of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1976). But see Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James
Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), reprinted in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BiL OF RIGHTs: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 1140 (1971), which indicates that Jefferson may have been "fighting," in part,
for commercial advertising:
I must now say a word on the declaration of rights you have been so good
as to send me. I like it as far as it goes; but I should have been for going further.
For instance the following alterations and additions would have pleased me. Art.
4. 'The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak to write
or otherwise to publish any thing but false facts affecting injuriously the life,
liberty, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of the confederacy with foreign nations ..

Id. at 1143.
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Thus, underlying Chrestensen was the notion that the Framers
had never intended to protect commercial advertising, leaving it
regulable to the same extent as other commercial activity.
Ill.

EROSION OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE

After handing down the Chrestensendecision, the Court consistently avoided applying the commercial speech "doctrine. '""
For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 the Court
found a putatively libelous political advertisement to be worthy
of first amendment protection notwithstanding that it took the
form of a commercial advertisement.37 The Court distinguished
New York Times from Chrestensen on the ground that the advertisement in Chrestensen"did no more than propose a commercial
transaction," whereas the content of the New York Times advertisement was worthy of political note.3"
Nine years later, in PittsburghPress Co. v. PittsburghCommission on Human Relations,9 the Court upheld an ordinance
prohibiting newspapers from publishing separate layouts of male
and female want ads. Respondents in Pittsburgh Press relied
principally upon the argument that want ads are commercial
speech within the meaning of the Chrestensenrule and are, therefore, unprotected. 0 Appellants, on the other hand, argued that
Chrestensen was inapplicable because the instant case involved
the exercise of editorial judgment by the newspaper regarding the
placement of the advertisement." Although the Court found want
ads to be "classic examples of commercial speech," and "no more
than a proposal of possible employment,"42 it declined to rely
upon the commercial speech doctrine in finding the want ads
regulable:
Discrimination in employment is not only commercial activity,
it is illegal commercial activity under the Ordinance. We have
35. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court found only one decision besides Chrestensento support the
commercial speech doctrine, i.e., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). The Virginia
Pharmacy decision noted that "[s]ince the decision in Breard . . .the Court has never
denied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was 'commercial speech."' Vir.
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
759 (1976).

36. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
37. Id. at 265-66.
38. Id. at 266.

39. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
40. Id. at 384.
41. Id. at 386.
42. Id. at 385.
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no doubt that a newspaper constitutionally could be forbidden
to publish a want ad proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting
prostitutes. Nor would the result be different if the nature of the
transaction were indicated by placement under columns captioned "Narcotics for Sale" and "Prostitutes Wanted" rather
than stated within the four corners of the advertisement.43
Thus the Court found the want ads to be regulable not because
they proposed commercial activity, but because they proposed
illegal activity.
In 1975 the Supreme Court decided Bigelow v. Virginia.44 The
words of one commentator suggest that that case "severely restricted, if it did not overrule, Valentine v. Chrestensen."'5 The
facts in Bigelow were as follows: On February 8, 1971, the Virginia
Weekly contained an advertisement" proposing that women
travel to New York for lawful abortions. Such solicitation was
illegal under a Virginia statute.4 7 After weighing the virtues of the
advertisement against the commonwealth's interest in protecting
the health of its citizens,4" the Supreme Court struck down this
43. Id. at 388. But see Ex parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), where the Court found
that Congress was capable of banning all lottery advertisements from the mails though
the lotteries were themselves lawful.
44. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
45. Freedman, Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: A Proposed Redraft of
Canon 2 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183, 192 (1976).
46. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 812 (1975). The advertisement read:
UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make
all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling.
47. VA. CODE § 18.1-63 (1950) (repealed 1975) read: "If any person, by publication,
lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other
manner, encourage or prompt the procuring of abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty
of a misdemeanor."
48. For a severe criticism of Bigelow's summary treatment of commonwealth interests, see 42 TEN. L. REv. 573, 581-83 (1975).
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application of the statute as violative of the first amendment.
The Court in Bigelow refused to commit itself to the proposition that commercial speech is fully protected under the first
amendment. Instead, it declared that "commercial advertising
enjoys a degree of first amendment protection." 49 Since intelligent interpretations differ as to the degree of protection to be
afforded commercial advertising," it would appear that the
Court's method of analysis in Bigelow was elusive. Had the Court
held commercial advertising to be fully protected under the first
amendment, state abridgement of the right to free commercial
speech would be struck down unless it were supported by a compelling state interest.5 To avoid foreclosing all paths of retreat,
the Court avoided such a broad ruling.
It is clear that the Bigelow Court weighed the interests of the
speakers against those of the state. However, the elusive test
implicit in Bigelow demanded clarification. The Court attempted
to clarify its test in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
52
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.
IV.

Virginia Pharmacy

Bigelow created the impression that the protection afforded
the Virginia Weekly advertisement resulted solely from the direct
relationship between the advertisement and the new-found right
to an abortion.53 If the Court had protected the Virginia Weekly
advertisement solely because it related to the exercise of a distinct constitutional right, then it would necessarily follow that
ordinary advertisements, such as those for drugs or groceries,
would not merit protection since they do not pertain to a distinct
constitutional right. This was not an unreasonable reading of
Bigelow; however, the Court recently laid to rest any such interpretation. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,5 the Court held that commer49. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975).
50. For differing interpretations of the Bigelow method of analysis, see 1975 B.Y.UL,
REv. 797; 54 N.C.L. REv. 468 (1976); 42 TENN. L. REV. 573 (1975).
51. See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
52. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
53. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975). The Court stated: "[Tihe advertisement conveyed information of potential interest and value'to a diverse audience. ...
Also, the activity advertised pertained to constitutional interests." Id. (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
54. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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cial advertising is entitled to some protection even if it does not
pertain to the exercise of any other right:
Here, in contrast [to Bigelow], the question whether there
is a First Amendment exception for "commercial speech" is
squarely before us. Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize
on any subject, cultural, philosophical, or political. He does not
wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact, or to make
generalized observations even about commercial matters. The
"idea" he wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you
the X prescription drug at the Y price." Our question, then, is
is wholly outside the protection of
whether this communication
5
the First Amendment.

The initial lawsuit in Virginia Pharmacy was brought not by
pharmacists but by prescription drug consumers who claimed
"that they would greatly benefit if the prohibition were lifted and
advertising freely allowed.""6 Thus, the case did not directly address the right to speak, but rather addressed the right to receive
information. The Court found support in past cases for the proposition that protection is afforded to both the source and the recipients of communications.57
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy did not treat commercial
advertising in the traditional terms of protected and unprotected
speech. Any attempt to force the Court's analysis into those traditional categories would be to overburden a limited analytical
method. The Court recognized the limitations of that labeling
technique by continually referring to "some" protection ", for commercial advertising.
55. Id. at 760-61. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1950) provided:

Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who
(3) publishes advertises or promotes, directly or indirectly, in any manner

whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms
. . .for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription.

56. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 753 (1976).
57. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (right to receive political publications sent from abroad); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (right to receive
information concerning religious meetings from door-to-door solicitors). See generally
Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine: New Constitutional Considerations,63 GEO. L.J. 775 (1975). See also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
58. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 760 (1976); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 821 (1975). See also Comment,
First Amendment Protectionfor Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional
Doctrine, 44 U. CH. L. REV. 205, 213-22 (1976).
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Following his discussion of the development and erosion of
the commercial speech doctrine," Justice Blackmun addressed
the facts of the case. Focusing on the interest of consumers in
receiving drug price information, he found that the harm to consumers resulting from the commonwealth's regulation was substantial:
Those whom the suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are the poor, the sick, and particularly the
aged. A disproportionate amount of their income tends to be
spent on prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to learn,
by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce
dollars are best spent."
Justice Blackmun then commented upon the general societal interest in the efficient operation of the market system. He found
that the system runs efficiently only where buyers and sellers
have full knowledge of market price." Finally, the Court examined the harms which the Virginia regulation was designed to
diminish. Virginia offered the following justifications for its regulation: Unfettered price advertising destroys both a high degree
of pharmaceutical professionalism and the physician-pharmacist
relationship. Furthermore, advertising by some pharmacists will
eventually force all pharmacists to advertise competitively, leading to higher, not lower, drug prices. Finally, the unregulated
advertising of drug prices demeans the pharmacist in the public
eye and thereby damages the profession."2
Having analyzed the harms produced by the statute on the
one hand, and those produced by free drug-price advertising on
the other, the Court struck down the statute because it produced
harms greater than those it eliminated. In sum, the Court addressed the following questions:
I. What harms are brought about by the instant state
regulation?
II. What harms would result if the industry were permitted to advertise in an unregulated fashion?
59. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 758-61 (1976).
60. Id. at 763.
61. Id. at 764.
62. Id. at 766-69.
63. Id. at 770.
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Il. Which set of harms is greater, and should therefore be
eliminated?"
Although the Court also discussed the public interest, 5 separate inquiry into this matter in commercial speech adjudication
is unnecessary and duplicative. For example, the aged and sickly,
significantly harmed by the Virginia regulation, have an interest
in the efficient working of the market system. Conversely, the
segment of society significantly harmed by the absence of such
state regulation, presumably pharmacists, has an interest in the
inefficient working of that very system. The public-at-large is
relatively disinterested in the outcome of this dispute, because
the effect on the larger public will be minimal either way the
Court decides. That "society . . .[has] a strong interest in the
free flow of commercial information"66 is, therefore, a mere truism
that serves only to obfuscate the issues. Since the cost of advertising will be borne by the public-at-large, the pecuniary interest of
the larger public may in fact militate against striking down the
regulation.
The Court, in Virginia Pharmacy, chose not to employ the
rigid protected-unprotected method of analysis. Instead, its only
inquiry was whether the legislature acted reasonably in passing
the statute, i.e., eliminated greater harms than it produced.67
Virginia Pharmacy demonstrates that the reasonable legislature
considers not only the number of citizens harmed, but also the
gravity of the harm and the capability of each citizen to bear the
burdens created by possible legislation. 8
Comparing the harms, as the Court did in Virginia
Pharmacy, constitutes an eminently rational approach to commercial speech litigation. First, harm-weighing focuses the
Court's attention on the factual and concrete harms created by
the instant regulation, obviating the need for a discussion of metaphysical rules. Secondly, case-by-case analysis in the style of
64. The phrasing of this three-step test is that of Professor Ronald H. Silverman of
the Hofstra Law School. Professor Silverman has asserted that "harm-weighing" is an
appropriate analytical tool in determining the validity of any statute under attack on
constitutional grounds. Although the method may have applications outside the first
amendment area, this comment deals only with its application to commercial speech
adjudication.
65. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 764 (1976).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 770.
68. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
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Virginia Pharmacy permits the "mills of justice to grind exceeding fine.""9
This latter point was entirely missed by Justice Rehnquist in
his dissent to Virginia Pharmacy. Justice Rehnquist interpreted
the majority as holding that all commercial speech is protected
so long as it does not mislead. He stated that that doctrine would
result in unregulated advertising by all professionals' and a
major upset in speech regulation under the National Labor Relations Act.7 1 The dissent found the following types of speech
constitutionally indistinguishable: An employer promising benefit to his employees if they reject unionization; 2 a pharmacist
advertising the price of a standardized drug; 73 and a lawyer advertising his fee for a title search.74 Justice Rehnquist also insisted
that under VirginiaPharmacy,advertisements such as the following would be constitutionally protected:
Pain getting you down? Insist that your physician prescribe
demerol. You pay
a little more than for aspirin, but you get a
75
lot more relief.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist failed to perceive that the majority
did not employ the traditional protected-unprotected analysis.
Furthermore, he failed to observe that the harms created by the
commercial advertisement in each of his examples differ. For
example, an obvious harm created by Justice Rehnquist's
demerol advertisement would be the risk of a rise in drug dependency, a harm not caused by the advertising of prices only. As
Chief Justice Burger pointed out, judicial treatment of each commercial advertisement will differ at law as a consequence of factual differences. 6
Chief Justice Burger, concurring with the majority, indicated
that advertising by doctors and lawyers differs considerably in
effect from price advertising by pharmacists. After equating the
pharmacist who sells prepackaged drugs with the "clerk who sells
69. See H. Longfellow, Retribution, reprinted in H. LONGFELLOW, THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 616 (Cambridge ed. 1893).

70. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 785 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 785-86.
72. Id. at 786.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 785.
75. Id. at 788.
76. Id. at 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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lawbooks,"" Chief Justice Burger suggested that advertising by
lawyers and doctors would be misleading because the professional
services advertised necessarily involve a high degree of individual, professional judgment. Therefore, different services would be
advertised under the same name. 8 The majority opinion would
appear to support this view,79 although it is uncertain whether
this view will prevail when lawyers' advertising is examined directly."0
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Virginia Pharmacy,
many lower courts had already recognized that the first amendment militates against unreasonable state interference with commercial advertisement.8 Very recently, federal courts have struck2
state bans on advertising optometric products and legal services
3
and on advertising oleomargarine using certain dairy terms.
Various state courts have followed their example;8 4 however, these
cases fail to provide a proper method of analysis. Virginia
Pharmacy is important primarily because it dictates such a
method.
Although Virginia Pharmacy mandated harm-weighing as
the proper mode of commercial speech adjudication, apparently
it failed to do so clearly enough. Recently, the New York Court
of Appeals misconstrued the Virginia Pharmacy test. In People
77. 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1831. This passage was deleted in the official reports.
78. 425 U.S. at 773 n.25. With regard to standardization of professional services, the
question arises whether the majority is acquainted with such standardized forms as those
distributed by Julius Blumberg, Inc. of New York. Mr. Justice Rehnquist found that the
majority merely "toss[ed] a bone" to lawyers and doctors in footnote 25. Id. at 785.
79. Id. at 773 n.25.
80. The Court recently agreed to hear a lawyers' advertising case. In re Bates &
O'Steen, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Bates & O'Steen v. Arizona
State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976) (No. 76-316).
81. See, e.g., Terry v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 395 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Cal.
1975), aff'd, 426 U.S. 913 (1976); Florida Bd. of Pharmacy v. Webb's City, Inc., 219 So.
2d 681 (Fla. 1969); Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270 Md. 103, 311 A.2d
487 (1971). But see Urowsky v. Board of-Regents, 38 N.Y.2d 364, 342 N.E.2d 583, 379
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1975). For a criticism of Urowsky, see 4 HoFsTRA L. REV. 867 (1976).
82. Terminal-Hudson Elecs., Inc. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, 407 F. Supp.
1075 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacatedand remanded, 96 S. Ct. 2619 (1976) (optometric products);
Consumers Union of the United States v. ABA, 45 U.S.L.W. 2309 (E.D. Va. Dec. 17, 1976)
(legal services).
83. Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. Washington State Dep't of Agriculture, 402 F. Supp.
1253 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
84. See cases cited note 81 supra.
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v. Remeny,51 a majority of the Court of Appeals found a New York
City ordinance8 which entirely banned commercial handbilling
to be unconstitutional under Virginia Pharmacy.The defendant
there had been found guilty of violating the ordinance by having
distributed handbills which named the performances and listed
the times, places, and prices of certain concerts.
In Remeny the significant harms produced by the ordinance
may be summarized as follows: Advertisers must use less desirable means of advertising-advertising that is more expensive
and/or less effective than handbilling. The occupation of commercial handbilling is eliminated. Some would-be advertisers will
not be able to create sufficient demand for their enterprises to
assure economic survival. Further, that segment of the public
wishing to receive the commercial information must now pay for
it by purchasing a newspaper or maintaining a radio or television
set. Secondly, harms which may be caused by unregulated commercial handbilling include the following: Sidewalk traffic is obstructed because handbillers purposefully choose crowded sites
for distribution. Handbills litter the streets because recipients
generally discard handbills immediately. The public must pay
the cleanup costs. Street traffic is more dangerous because handbills tend to be lifted by the wind, obscuring the vision of drivers.
Furthermore, pedestrians frequently find handbillers annoying.
The final analytical step consists of comparing the harms caused
by the regulation with the harms caused by the unregulated advertisement. This is the most difficult step in the analysis. People
v. Remenys' does not present an easy case.
Judge Wachtler's majority opinion in Remeny refused to examine the harms at all, stating: "If an ordinance absolutely prohibiting all distribution of handbills containing constitutionally
85. 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355 N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
86. NEw YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 755(2)-7.0(5) (1970).

No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or cause or permit to be thrown, cast
or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or other advertising
matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place, or in a front yard or
courtyard, or on any stoop, or in the vestibule of any hall in any building, or in
a letter box therein, provided that nothing herein contained shall be deemed to

prohibit or otherwise regulate the delivery of any such matter by the United
States postal service, or prohibit the distribution of sample copies of newspapers
regularly sold by the copy or by annual subscription. This section is not intended
to prevent the lawful distribution of anything other than commercial and business advertising matter.

Id.
87. 40 N.Y.2d 527, 355 N.E.2d 375, 387 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1976).
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protected statements on political, social and religious topics is
invalid, then this ordinance relating to commercial speech, now
also constitutionally protected, suffers from the same infirmity.",
In his dissent, Judge Jasen criticized the majority's overly
broad holding in Remeny:
In my view, the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court
has now twice stated, requires that a court in passing upon the
constitutionality of a legislative enactment affecting commercial speech, engage in balancing the competing societal interests
represented. The court in reaching its decision does not take into
consideration the relevant factors.89
Judge Jasen's criticism is thoroughly warranted.
The Supreme Court of Florida recently passed upon the constitutionality of a statute making it civilly actionable for a collection agency to "[c]ommunicate or threaten to communicate
with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining final judgment
against the debtor, unless the debtor gives his permission.""0 Appellant Harris, debtor to appellee Beneficial Finance Co., brought
an action against Beneficial as provided by the statute. Beneficial
argued on appeal that the statute runs afoul of the first amendment as interpreted in Virginia Pharmacy. The Supreme Court
of Florida upheld the statute: 91
[T]he potential recipients of the information sought to be conveyed in the [Virginia Pharmacy] case had a striking and obvious interest in acquiring such knowledge. It is difficult for us
to believe that Harris' employers have any similar interest in the
information they received from Beneficial's agents.
. . . Thus the proper test in considering this statute is to
weigh the individual's interest against the government's interest. . . . We hold that the public interest in proscribing harass88. Id. at 530, 355 N.E.2d at 377, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
89. Id. at 536-37, 355 N.E.2d at 381-82, 387 N.Y.S.2d at 421 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
90. FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 559.72(4) (West Supp. 1976-77) provides:

In collecting consumer claims, whether or not licensed by the division, no person
shall: . . . (4) Communicate or threaten to communicate with a debtor's employer prior to obtaining final judgment against the debtor, unless the debtor
gives his permission in writing to contact his employer or acknowledges in writing the existence of the debt after the debt has been placed for collection, but
this shall not prohibit a person from telling the debtor that his employer will
be contacted if a final judgment is obtained.
Id.
91. Harris v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 338 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1976).
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ment of a debtor through contact with his employer about an
obligation to a third party simply transcends a finance company's interest in choosing this particular means of collecting a
debt.2
Thus the court found that VirginiaPharmacy mandated the balancing of the harms to the interested parties. 3
This Term, the Supreme Court of the United States will hear
an Arizona case involving lawyers' advertising. 4 In re Bates &
O'Steen 5 involved a disciplinary proceeding against two attorneys who advertised their fees for certain services in violation of
a disciplinary rule of the Supreme Court of Arizona." A majority
of the Supreme Court of Arizona voted to censure the lawyers,
upholding their rule against numerous constitutional challenges.
Respondent attorneys Bates and O'Steen, through counsel,
argued that the advertising ban is unconstitutional under
Virginia Pharmacy. Chief Justice Cameron's majority opinion
rejected respondents' contention,97 rooting the holding in longstanding legal tradition and relying heavily upon Chief Justice
Burger's concurring opinion in Virginia Pharmacy. Apart from
lengthy quotations from Bigelow and Virginia Pharmacy, however, Chief Justice Cameron provided little explicit analysis of his
own. If in fact the majority weighed the harms, it failed to do so
explicitly.
Justice Holohan's dissenting opinion, on the other hand,
raises at least one harm-balancing objection to the flat ban on
lawyers' advertising:
While the majority concludes that [Virginia Pharmacy]
supports a complete ban on advertising by attorneys, I am not
92. Id. at 199.

93. Id. at 198-99. Although the court discussed the government interest in protecting
the debtor, it is clear that this interest is principally the debtor's.
In re Bates & O'Steen, 555 P.2d 640 (Ariz.), prob. juris. noted sub noma. Bates &
v. Arizona State Bar, 97 S. Ct. 53 (1976) (No. 76-316).
Id.
Id. at 641. The court stated:
Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) of Rule 29(a) of the Rules of the Supreme Court
reads:
"A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements
in the city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor
shall he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.***"

94.
O'Steen
95.
96.

97. Id. at 643.
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inclined to such a conclusion. Certain kinds of advertising by
lawyers may cause confusion and deception, but the remedy is
to ban such kinds of advertising rather than any form of advertising. This appears to me to be what the Court meant in
[Virginia Pharmacy]."
In response to Justice Holohan's fact sensitivity, Justice Gordon's special concurring opinion reveals the basic dilemma of
judges faced with the problem of lawyers' advertising:
Whether a blanket ban on certain forms of advertising is unconstitutional as violative of the First Amendment is a [weighty]
question which I am not yet prepared to resolve in the negative.
I am concerned, however, that to impulsively discard the regulations leaving few if any guidelines in their wake, might well
initiate a flood of media combat for legal business which would
serve neither the best interests of the public nor the Bar.9
VI.

CONCLUSION

It would have been beneficial if Virginia Pharmacy had resolved the analytical confusion created by Chrestensen and the
cases following, since it appears that for some time to come
courts may continue to rely mistakenly on the discredited labeling technique of commercial speech adjudication. Future Supreme Court decisions would best serve to clarify the doctrinal
controversy by avoiding entirely such labels as "protected" and
"unprotected." Nonetheless, Virginia Pharmacy serves as a
commendable foundation for commercial speech adjudication
based upon concrete fact and sound social policy.
Neal Robert Platt
98. Id. at 649 (Holohan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Since the Bates
advertisement contained standard fees, the Supreme Court will consider the harms produced by Arizona's ban on lawyers' price advertising. In this regard, Virginia Pharmacy
dictates that the Court consider the extent to which the gravest harms produced by
artificially high lawyers' fees have been eliminated by the advent of Legal Aid Societies,
and the due process right of the indigent criminal defendant to assigned counsel, see
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Recently, Maine lawyers obtained the right
to advertise services and fees. N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 1977, at 1.
99. In re Bates & O'Steen, 555 P.2d 640, 648 (Ariz. 1976) (Gordon, J., concurring).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1977

17

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 3 [1977], Art. 7

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol5/iss3/7

18

